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Rados: Computer Searches and Seizures

NOTE
UNITED STATES V. PAYTON:
REDEFINING THE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD FOR
COMPUTER SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario where officers arrive at a residence to
execute a search warrant in which evidence of drug use and
documents indicating drug trafficking are sought. The officers
search the home and find evidence of drug use but no documents
related to drug sales. They enter the bedroom and find both a file
cabinet and a computer. Based upon the officers’ experience and
training, they know that both the file cabinet and the computer
could contain items enumerated on the warrant – one in paper
form and the other in digital form. Neither the file cabinet nor the
computer is listed on the warrant, nor, the officers believe, is such
a listing required for them to search either one. Under traditional
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the officers can look in any
container where the items they seek could reasonably be
expected to be found. The Fourth Amendment makes no
distinction between a computer and a file cabinet, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit now does.
United States v. Payton1 held that officers may not seize or
search a computer unless there are “circumstances indicating a
likelihood” that the officers will find the evidence they seek on that
1

United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
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particular computer.2 In its holding, the court distinguished
traditional containers, such as file cabinets, from computers,
holding that, in contrast to the rule applicable to a traditional
container, it is not enough that the computer “could” contain the
evidence; rather, there must be some showing that the computer
“would” contain the evidence.3 This creates an impractical
constraint upon searches and seizures of computers and is
contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the Fourth
Amendment.4 Payton further marks a change in direction from
previous Ninth Circuit decisions by approaching what appears to
be a bright-line rule, namely that officers may not search a
computer without a warrant.5 If a computer search is not
authorized on the original warrant, officers must demonstrate
“circumstances indicating a likelihood” that what they are looking
for would be found in a particular computer.6 In turn, this would
allow the officers to secure the computer while applying for a
subsequent warrant to search the computer.7 Even as the Ninth
Circuit presumably intended to protect constitutional privacy
interests by changing the reasonableness standard in computer
searches from “could” to “would,” the unintended results will likely
have the opposite effect. The most likely result is this: So long as
the evidence they are seeking could be found in digital form, the
officers will simply request authorization, in the initial warrant, to
search any computer they might find. By doing so, they will – in
the event they find a computer in their initial search – avoid having
to seek a subsequent warrant by demonstrating circumstances
that implicate that particular computer.
This unintended
consequence will weaken the Ninth Circuit’s effort to protect
individual constitutional privacy in the context of computer
searches and seizures.
This Note examines United States v. Payton and the issue of
when it is reasonable to search a computer if it is not expressly
authorized on the search warrant.
Part I discusses the
background facts of Payton and the Fourth Amendment. Part II
analyzes why the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided Payton correctly
but focused on the wrong underlying reason in its holding. The

2

Id. at 863.
Id. at 863.
4
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
5
Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64.
6
Id. at 863.
7
Id.
3
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reasonableness standard for computer searches should be
whether the computer “could” contain the evidence, rather than
the stricter standard of “would” contain the evidence announced in
Payton.
However, because computers are different from
traditional containers, they should be subject to judicial
supervision and a defined search protocol as expressed through a
warrant. Part III explains how the Ninth Circuit in Payton
ultimately did what it had said it would not do in United States v.
Giberson: create a distinctive category for computers separate
from traditional containers and imply a bright-line rule mandating
that a computer may not be searched without a warrant.8 Part IV
proposes a practical reasonableness standard that balances the
special needs of a computer search with the flexibility found under
traditional container theories of searches and seizures. This Note
proposes a specific set of guidelines to establish a protocol for
properly seizing a computer that will effectively balance the
government’s interest in searching and seizing a computer with
the computer owner’s privacy interests.
I.

BACKGROUND

This Part starts by looking at the facts of United States v.
Payton and the two issues the Ninth Circuit addressed: the
validity of the search warrant and its scope.9 The second section
of this Part provides a general background of Fourth Amendment
law and a discussion of probable cause and the scope of a
warrant.10
A.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. PAYTON

On July 30, 2004, Officer Jeffrey R. Horn requested a search
warrant for a residence in Merced, California, based on suspicion
of drug trafficking and drug use.11 The warrant contained
“Attachment A,” which listed all drug-related items to be seized,
including “[s]ales ledgers showing narcotics transactions such as
pay/owe sheets”12 and “[f]inancial records of the person(s) in
control of the residence or premises, bank accounts, loan
8

United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008).
Payton, 573 F.3d at 861.
10
Id.
11
Opening Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir.
2009) (No. 07-10567), 2007 WL 5108020.
12
Payton, 573 F.3d at 860.
9
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applications, [and] income and expense records.”13
In the affidavit asserting probable cause, Officer Horn
requested permission to search any computers in the residence,14
even though he had no specific basis on which to believe that a
computer would be found in the house.15 He stated, based on his
experience and training, that drug dealers “maintain evidence of
sales of narcotics on their computers.”16 He further requested that
the warrant “allow [him] to look at computer files, and seize the
computer if it shows evidence of criminal behavior.”17 The request
to search any computers in the residence was inadvertently left off
of “Attachment A,”18 and the magistrate authorized the police to
search only those items listed.19
During the execution of the warrant, officers seized a small
quantity of methamphetamine as well as several pipes that
appeared to be the type used to smoke controlled substances.20
The officers also found evidence of marijuana leaves and seeds
on the floor of the master bedroom, which the officers determined
to be that of Michael Payton.21 While searching the master
bedroom, Officer Horn found a computer that he noted to be in
screen-saver mode.22
Officer Horn moved the mouse to
deactivate the screen saver; thereafter, the screen showed a list
of computer files and he clicked on the first one.23 The file opened
to reveal what appeared to be a naked 10-year-old girl lying on a
bed with her legs spread apart.24 Officer Horn believed the image
to be child pornography, closed the file, and seized the
computer.25 The officers found no evidence of drug sales in the
residence.26
Michael Payton was charged with possession of child
pornography27 and moved to suppress the evidence on two
13

Id.
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 5.
15
Id. at 8.
16
Brief for Appellee at 7, Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (No. 07-10567), 2008 WL 2623359.
17
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 8.
18
Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 7.
19
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 6.
20
Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 7.
21
Id.
22
Id.; United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 2009).
23
Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 8.
24
Id.
25
Id.; Payton, 573 F.3d at 860.
26
Payton, 573 F.3d at 860.
27
Michael Payton was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which
14
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grounds.28 He argued that the warrant lacked probable cause and
that the search of the computer exceeded the scope of the
warrant.29 The district court denied the motion to suppress the
evidence, finding that the warrant was based upon sufficient
probable cause, and ruled that the defect of failing to list the
computer listed on “Attachment A” was cured by the magistrate’s
subsequent testimony that he had intended to authorize a search
of computers.30
1.

Probable Cause for the Search Warrant

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s ruling that the
warrant was based upon sufficient probable cause.31 Officer Horn
stated in his affidavit for probable cause that neighbors had
complained of drug sales.32 However, during a Franks33 hearing,
Officer Horn testified that he knew of no neighbors complaining of
drug sales, only of one neighbor complaining of drug use.34
Officer Horn had inferred from the complaint of drug use that
probable drug sales were going on.35 Further, Officer Horn
testified that he relied on the fact that during the previous arrest of
states that any person who
knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, 1 or more books,
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual
depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed
or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if-(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2010).
28
Payton, 573 F.3d at 860.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 861.
31
Id. The district court found that “‘even if [it] excised and consider[ed] the entire
warrant without a complaint of neighbors of drug sales,’ the warrant was still sufficient in
light of the other evidence presented.” Id.
32
Id. at 860.
33
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978). In a Franks hearing, a
defendant can challenge the validity of a facially valid warrant by contesting assertions
made in the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued. The warrant will be considered
invalid if the defendant can substantially show: 1) a false statement was included in the
affidavit, 2) the false statement was necessary to find probable cause, and 3) the affiant
knowingly or recklessly included the false statement.
34
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 8.
35
Id.
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another resident of the home, he and his fellow officers had found
2.7 grams of methamphetamine pinned to the inside of her bra.36
The fact that the drugs were divided into two separate bags, as
well as the quantity involved, led Officer Horn to believe the
resident possessed the drugs for sale.37 This Case Note will not
address the issue of probable cause for the warrant and the
reasoning behind the court’s finding at the Franks hearing but will
instead focus on the scope of the warrant.
2.

Scope of Warrant

In addition to challenging the probable cause supporting the
warrant, Michael Payton argued that the search of the computer
exceeded the scope of the warrant because the warrant did not
authorize the search and seizure of any computers.38 However,
the district court held that the search of the computer was valid
“because the failure to include the word ‘computers’ in Attachment
A was an oversight cured by the issuing judge’s testimony of his
intent.”39
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that after-the-fact testimony could not cure the
search warrant’s lack of the word “computers.”40 Merced County
Superior Court Judge John Kirihara testified at the federal
evidentiary hearing regarding the issuance of the warrant, stating
that he often asks officers to add items to the Attachment that they
may have missed.41 He did not do so in this case and only
authorized those items listed.42 Judge Kirihara noted, however,
that he was aware Officer Horn had requested permission to
search computers and that he had intended to authorize that
search.43 Neither Officer Horn nor Judge Kirihara noticed that the
word “computers” was missing from Attachment A.44
The Ninth Circuit held that this after-the-fact testimony did not
provide the authorization necessary to search computers, since
“one purpose of a warrant is to inform the person subject to the
36

Id. at 7.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 5.
38
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 11.
39
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 2009).
40
Id. at 862.
41
Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 6.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 6-7.
44
Id. at 7.
37
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search just what may be searched.”45 Upon this holding, the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis turned to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
concerning the circumstances in which a computer may be seized
and searched absent express authorization in a search warrant.
B.

RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.46

The Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791 in response to
the English practice of issuing general warrants against political
suspects, and the colonial practice of issuing writs of assistance
against those suspected of smuggling goods.47 The general
warrant and the writ of assistance gave executing officers
authority to search without limitation48 and allowed “a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”49 To curtail
these general warrants and writs of assistance, the Fourth
Amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures. 50
The Fourth Amendment applies to searches or seizures
under two conditions. First, the government must be performing
the search or seizure.51 The Fourth Amendment does not protect
a search or seizure performed by a private actor.52 Second, a
person must have a justifiable expectation of privacy in the
intruded-upon area.53 This requires the person whose property is
searched or seized to have both a subjective expectation of
privacy as well as an objective one “that society is prepared to

45

Payton, 573 F.3d at 862 (citing United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
46
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361,
361-64 (1921).
48
Id. at 361.
49
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
50
Fraenkel, supra note 47, at 366.
51
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
52
Id.
53
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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recognize as reasonable.”54
In Katz v. United States, the FBI attached an electronic
listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth and
recorded a conversation.55 The United States Supreme Court
determined that Katz had a subjective expectation of privacy when
he entered the telephone booth and placed his phone call, based
on the rationale that he had no reason to believe his conversation
would be overheard.56 In addition, the Supreme Court determined
that Katz had an objective expectation of privacy,57 holding that
while a public telephone booth provides no expectation of privacy
in what can be seen, there is an expectation of privacy in what can
be heard.58
A governmental search or seizure of property in which a
person has a subjective and objective expectation of privacy
violates the Fourth Amendment if it is “unreasonable.”59 The
Supreme Court has explained that reasonableness is determined
by “balancing [the] intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”60 The search or seizure is reasonable if it is authorized
by a valid warrant or if it fits in one of the warrant exceptions.61
In a warrant situation as in Payton, a neutral magistrate judge
conducts the balancing test and determines whether a search
warrant will be issued.62 The search warrant must (1) be based
54

Id. at 361.
Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
56
Id. at 352.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
61
There are limited circumstances in which officers may conduct a search or seizure
without a warrant. These include the following: searches that are incident to a lawful arrest,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); searches of automobiles when
officers have probable cause to believe instrumentalities of crime, evidence, or contraband
are within the automobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); seizures of
contraband when it is in plain view of an officer, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
465 (1971); searches of people whom the police have an articulable suspicion to believe
are involved in criminal activity, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); searches of places
and things when the officers are given consent by a person with authority to consent,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); and searches and seizures due to
exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances include hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967), reason to believe that evidence will be
destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770
(1966), and reason to believe someone may be in imminent danger, Brigham City v.
Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
62
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
55
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upon probable cause and supported by oath or affirmation, and (2)
particularly describe the places to be searched and the items to be
seized.63 The language of the warrant determines the scope of
the search, which in turn is based on an objective standard of
reasonableness.64
1.

Search Warrant’s Probable-Cause Determination

Probable cause is a fluid concept that does not deal with hard
certainties.65 It exists when facts and circumstances would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that seizable evidence would be
found on the premises or person to be searched.66 Whether there
is sufficient information to give rise to probable cause is based on
the totality of the circumstances.67 Under this approach, the
relative weights of all indicia of reliability can be assessed and
balanced.68 Under this standard, no single piece of evidence need
be conclusive. Rather, everything is examined in light of the other
facts. Accordingly, an officer wishing to apply for a search warrant
must prepare an affidavit outlining the facts69 that cause the officer
to believe the evidence sought would be at the time and place that
the search is to be conducted.70
An officer may prepare an affidavit based entirely on
hearsay,71 such as testimony by a victim of crime, witnesses, or
police informants. In using hearsay information, the affidavit must
show that the informant is reliable and has a basis of knowledge
for the information.72 The affidavit is then presented to a neutral
magistrate, who makes an independent evaluation as to whether
there is sufficient probable cause.73
2.

Particularity Requirement
“The Fourth Amendment’s specificity requirement prevents
63

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984).
65
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
66
Id.
67
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 252 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
68
Id. at 234 (majority opinion).
69
Affidavits must consist of facts and not conclusions. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
70
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
71
Id. at 242.
72
Id. at 227.
73
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
64
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officers from engaging in general, exploratory searches by limiting
their discretion and providing specific guidance as to what can and
cannot be searched and seized.”74 This requirement prevents
what may amount to a fishing expedition. As the Supreme Court
explained:
By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and
things for which there is probable cause to search, the
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to
its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wideranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit.75

Therefore, the more detailed and specific the descriptions of
the items to be seized on the warrant are, the more limited the
search will be, and the more likely the warrant will be upheld as
constitutional.
A warrant is deemed unconstitutional if it does not describe
with sufficient particularity the place to be searched and the items
to be seized, even if the affidavit itself is sufficiently
particularized.76 However, the warrant need only be “reasonably
specific, rather than elaborately detailed,”77 “and the specificity
required ‘varies depending on the circumstances of the case and
the type of items involved.’”78 For example, a warrant authorizing
the seizure of accounting-related documents like ledgers, bank
records, and spreadsheets would likely satisfy the particularity
requirement. However, the description of accounting-related
documents does not have to be exact.79

74

United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006).
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
76
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
77
United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States
v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982)).
78
Rude, 88 F.3d at 1551 (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
79
The Ninth Circuit considers three factors in determining whether a warrant meets
the particularity requirement:
75

(1) [W]hether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described
in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which
executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not;
and (3) whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in
light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued.
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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The Scope of a Search Is Based on an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness

The scope of a search warrant is based on an objective
standard determined by the language of the warrant, without
regard to the subjective intent of the executing officers or the
issuing magistrate judge.80 Thus, “[a] policeman’s pure heart does
not entitle him to exceed the scope of a search warrant, nor does
his ulterior motive bar a search within the scope of the warrant,
where the warrant was properly issued.”81 The objective standard
of reasonableness must guide the officer in his or her search.82
In using an objective reasonableness standard, the officer
cannot look for an object in places smaller than the object
authorized by the warrant.83 However, once an officer finds a
container that may conceal the object authorized by the warrant,
the container may be opened immediately.84 The Supreme Court
justified this by stating that “the individual’s interest in privacy must
give way to the magistrate’s official determination of probable
cause.”85
Moreover, there is no Fourth Amendment distinction between
traditional containers that are readily accessible and those that are
locked.86 Once again, the courts have held that the driving factor
is one of “reasonableness.”87 If it is reasonable to believe a
container may have evidence within it, the officer may take
measures to open it.88 An officer does not need to seek a
separate warrant to search a locked container if he or she is
working within the scope of the original warrant.89 As the Fifth
Circuit has explained, to hold otherwise would
require either that “an additional search warrant (be obtained)
for each container within a larger container,” or that the agent
seeking the warrant possess extrasensory perception so that he
80

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1996).
82
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
83
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
84
Id. at 823.
85
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
86
United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United
States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 573) (5th Cir. 1981)).
87
See, e.g., United States. V. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).
88
Id.
89
Id.
81
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could describe, prior to entering the house, the specific boxes,
suitcases, sofas, closets, etc. that he anticipated searching.
Obviously, neither alternative is either reasonable or required.90

This holds true even if the container cannot be opened on the
premises and must be removed to be opened.91
II.

PAYTON REACHED THE RIGHT RESULT BUT FOCUSED ON THE
WRONG REASON

In Payton, the Ninth Circuit suppressed the evidence obtained
from the computer for two reasons. First, the search of the
computer was unreasonable.92 Second, the search was not
authorized by a warrant.93 However, in reaching its conclusion,
the court followed Giberson and changed the standard of
reasonableness from one requiring only that the evidence could
be found in the computer to one requiring circumstances that
indicate the evidence would be found in the computer.94
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit departed from Supreme Court
precedent95 in container searches and applied an impractical
reasonableness standard. In its holding, the court states that
absent evidence implicating the computer, a computer cannot be
seized (and by implication, a subsequent warrant will not issue).96
Since in Payton there were no circumstances indicating a
likelihood that the evidence would be found in the computer, the
court held that the search of the computer was unreasonable.97
The Ninth Circuit should only have considered whether the
items could have been found on the computer and the fact that a
90

United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Kralik, 611 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1979)).
91
United States v. Johnson, 709 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir. 1983) (locked safe
reasonably believed to contain items enumerated in warrant was permissibly moved to
police station where it could be opened).
92
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 862-63 (quoting United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir.
2008)).
95
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
96
In United States v. Giberson, the court held that, absent “evidence” implicating the
computer, a seizure of Giberson’s computer would not have been reasonable. Giberson,
527 F.3d at 887. In United States v. Payton, the court applied the same standard to the
search of a computer and reasoned that “the special considerations of reasonableness
involved in the search of computers are reflected in the practice . . . of searching officers to
stop and seek an explicit warrant when they encounter a computer that they have reason to
believe should be searched.” Payton, 573 F.3d at 864 (emphasis added).
97
Payton, 573 F.3d at 863.
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subsequent warrant for the computer was not obtained. Even
though it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that the
computer contained the items he sought, by not obtaining a
warrant for its search, he acted in the absence of judicial
supervision and without an approved search protocol. This
reasoning would still have allowed the court to suppress the
evidence while retaining a reasonableness standard consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
This Part begins by explaining the Ninth Circuit’s basis for
suppressing the evidence.
Next, this Part analyzes the
reasonableness standard set forth in Payton and discusses why
this rule is impractical and will likely have unintended
consequences. This requires a journey back to United States v.
Giberson, the prior precedent-setting case on search warrants and
computers. This also requires a brief survey and comparison of
other jurisdictions’ standards on this issue. This Part concludes
with an analysis of the differences between a computer and a
traditional container and why there should be different search
protocols for each of them.
A.

NINTH CIRCUIT’S BASIS FOR SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE

The Ninth Circuit found the actions of the officers in Payton
unreasonable for two reasons. First, in the course of Officer
Horn’s search, he did not find evidence to support his conclusion
that the computer he found contained items enumerated in the
warrant.98 Instead, Officer Horn relied on the fact that the
evidence he sought could be found on a computer.99 In its
analysis, the court applied the stricter “would” standard it first
enunciated in Giberson100 and found that the facts of Payton did
not meet that standard.101
In Giberson, agents had a search warrant to look for, among
Upon
other things, evidence pertaining to identity theft.102
executing the warrant, the officers discovered a personal
computer on a desk in one of the bedrooms.103 The computer was

98

Payton, 573 F.3d at 864.
Id. at 863 (recognizing that pay/owe sheets are physically capable of being kept
on a computer).
100
Giberson, 527 F.3d at 887.
101
Payton, 573 F.3d at 684.
102
Giberson, 527 F.3d at 884.
103
Id.
99
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connected to a printer located on an adjacent dresser.104 On the
dresser were “what appeared to be fake Nevada I.D. cards” that
seemed to have been printed from the printer.105 Upon searching
the desk and surrounding area, the agents found documents
“evidencing the production of false I.D.s, including fake Social
Security cards and State of New York birth certificates . . . .”106
The officers then seized the computer and secured a second
search warrant to search the computer itself.107
The Payton court approved of the officers’ actions in Giberson
and applied the same analysis to Payton.108 In Payton, the court
reiterated Giberson’s rule of reasonableness: “If it is reasonable
to believe that a computer contains items enumerated in the
warrant, officers may search it.”109 While this appears fairly broad
in scope, the court went on to narrow its position and reiterated
the new reasonableness standard it created in Giberson, stating
that “where there was ample evidence that the documents in the
warrant could be found on Giberson’s computer, the officers did
not exceed the scope of the warrant when they seized the
computer.”110 The Payton court applied the same reasonableness
standard it used to approve the seizure of Giberson’s computer to
the search of Payton’s computer.111 The court concluded there
was an absence of “legitimating facts” in Payton.112
Second, the court expressed disapproval of the fact that
Officer Horn chose to search the computer first, before seeking a
second warrant authorizing the search.113 This was in contrast to
the actions of the agent in Giberson, who seized the computer
first, and then sought a warrant before the search.114

104

Id.
Id.
106
Giberson, 527 F.3d at 884-85.
107
Id. at 885.
108
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2009).
109
Payton, 573 F.3d at 864 (quoting Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888).
110
Id. at 863 (emphasis in original).
111
Id. at 862-63.
112
Id. at 864.
113
Id. at 863.
114
Id.
105
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THE STANDARD FOR REASONABLENESS IN SEARCHING
COMPUTERS SHOULD BE THE SAME STANDARD AS FOR OTHER
TRADITIONAL CONTAINERS

B.

The reasonableness standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in
Payton is impractical. The officers in Payton were looking for
documents that could reasonably be found in a computer. In
today’s society, most people create spreadsheets on their
computers and download bank records directly to their computers.
As a result, a computer would be a reasonable place to search for
items such as pay/owe sheets and other financial documents.
Therefore, it was reasonable for the officer in Payton to believe
the computer was a place where the items in the warrant could be
found.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Payton from Giberson, noting
that, unlike the agents in Giberson, the officers in Payton found
nothing to indicate a likelihood that the computer contained the
evidence for which they were looking.115
The court again
reiterated its position on reasonableness, stating that it is not
enough that the evidence is capable of being contained in a
computer.116 In order for a search to be reasonable, there must
be “circumstances indicating a likelihood” that the items to be
seized are contained in the computer.117
Apart from the specific facts provided in Giberson, the Ninth
Circuit has offered very little guidance as to how “circumstances
indicating a likelihood” should be interpreted. There is no
indication of how strong a likelihood is needed, or how much
evidence is needed. If the circumstances of Giberson are used as
a guide, it would seem that the court requires a near certainty. In
Giberson, there was an incriminating document sitting next to the
printer that was connected to the computer.118 Because the
document was not of high quality, the officers believed it had
come from the printer.119 The association between the document
and the printer, and the printer’s connection to the computer, was
clear. It is difficult to imagine what different or additional
circumstances could arise so as to more clearly implicate a
specific computer. If the officers in Payton had found a printout of

115

Payton, 573 F.3d at 863.
Id. at 864.
117
Id. at 863.
118
United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2008).
119
Id.
116
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a pay/owe sheet in the same bedroom as the computer, but did
not find the document on or near a printer, it is unclear whether
the discovery of the document would have risen to the
“circumstances indicating a likelihood” standard.
Thus, Giberson’s and Payton’s “would be found” standard is
much stricter than the “could be found” standard for traditional
containers and computers used previously by the Ninth Circuit, its
sister circuits, and other courts. Payton, by upholding Giberson,
puts the Ninth Circuit out of line from the rest of the circuits across
the country.
1.

Prior to Giberson, Ninth Circuit Precedent Followed the
“Could Be Found” Reasonableness Standard

In United States v. Gomez-Soto, the Ninth Circuit stated that
“it is axiomatic that if a warrant sufficiently describes the premises
to be searched, this will justify a search of the personal effects
therein belonging to the person occupying the premises if those
effects might contain the items described in the warrant.”120 In
Gomez-Soto, officers conducted a search for documentation
pertaining to drug trafficking and seized a microcassette.121 The
court upheld the seizure, noting that microcassettes are used as a
device for recording all types of information, including the type that
would fall within the scope of the warrant.122 It further noted that a
warrant need not predict the form of the container in which the
information may be found.123 There is no mention of ample
evidence or circumstances making it likely the microcassette
contained the evidence sought. Rather, it was simply because the
microcassette could contain the information sought that the court
found the seizure reasonable.
In circumstances similar to those of Payton, in the Ninth
Circuit’s unpublished case of United States v. Sprewell, the
officers were executing a search warrant looking for evidence of
drug sales.124 Among the items sought were “ ‘any talley sheets
or pay and owe sheets which tend to establish any narcotics and

120

United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis

added).
121

Id. at 652-54.
Id. at 655.
123
Id.
124
United States v. Sprewell, Nos. 89-50571, 89-50695, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
14094, at *1 (9th Cir. June 26, 1991) (unpublished).
122
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dangerous drug transactions.’ ”125 As in Payton, the officers
discovered a computer during their search and seized it.126 The
court drew a comparison to its analysis in Gomez-Soto and stated
that “a computer is ‘by its very nature a device for recording
information.’ ”127 The court upheld the seizure and explained it
was not necessary to predict with precision what form the
evidence would be in for the warrant to be valid.128 In assessing
whether an item described by a warrant meets the particularity
requirement, the court considered whether it was possible for the
officer to more specifically describe the items to be seized based
on his or her information at the time the warrant was issued.129
Again, there was nothing that provided extra assurance that the
officers would find what they were looking for on the computer. It
was enough that the computer by its very nature could contain
what they were looking for.130 Therefore it was reasonable for the
officers to seize it.131
2.

Other Courts Follow the “Could Be Found” Reasonableness
Standard

In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carey, officers
were given written consent to search the premises for evidence of
drug sales, and in the course of their search they came upon and
seized a personal computer.132 The court upheld the seizure,
noting that
“in the age of modern technology and the commercial
availability of various forms of items, the warrant could not be
expected to describe with exactitude the precise form the
records would take” because drug records might be found in
cassettes, leases and accounts cards, or cancelled checks.133

The court did not create an extra requirement that the officers
executing the search find some additional evidence to implicate
125

Id. at *10 (quoting the search warrant).
Id. at *10-11.
127
Id. at *12 (quoting Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d at 655).
128
Id.
129
Id. at *13 (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)).
130
Id.
131
Id. at *10-13.
132
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).
133
Id. at 1275 n.7 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir.
1986)).
126
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the computer.
The Colorado Supreme Court determined that the “container
rationale is equally applicable to nontraditional, technological
‘containers’ that are reasonably likely to hold information in less
tangible forms.”134 Under this reasoning, the court upheld the
seizure of five laptop computers during a search for “materials that
provided instructions or examples concerning the production or
use of any firearms, ammunitions, and explosive or incendiary
devices or parts, as well as materials showing an intent to do
physical harm or physical damage against any person or
building.”135 The court found the computers were “likely to serve
as ‘containers’ for writings, or the functional equivalent of ‘written
or printed material,’ of a type enumerated in the warrant.”136
Like the Ninth Circuit in Gomez-Soto, the Colorado Supreme
Court noted that a warrant cannot always predict the form in which
evidence will come.137 The court determined that the laptops were
reasonably likely to serve as containers for the writings listed in
the warrant.138 As a part of its reasonableness analysis, the court
took note that the laptops “were not found in a packaged state or
in any way suggesting that they could not have been used for the
purposes for which they were designed,” thereby making them fair
game.139
In Commonwealth v. McDermott, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court likewise upheld a warrantless seizure of a
computer on the ground that the computer was similar to a closed
container and was capable of holding documents that were sought
under the search warrant.140 Among the items sought by the
officers there were documents “reflecting the possession, custody,
or control of the premises; documents reflecting the purchase of,
or license to carry, firearms and ammunition; documents reflecting
the employment, salary, and garnishment of wages of the
defendant. . . .”141
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District also
upheld a seizure of a laptop computer during a search for stolen

134

People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001).
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Gall, 30 P.3d at 153-54.
139
Id. at 154.
140
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 864 N.E. 471, 484 (Mass. 2007).
141
Id. at 483.
135
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goods.142 The warrant included the authority to seize any items
“tending to show dominion and control of the location,” and listed a
number of items in which this evidence could be found.143 The
defendant argued that the laptop was not one of the enumerated
items and therefore should not have been seized.144 The court
upheld the seizure and concluded that the officers “could not be
expected to divine in advance of their entry the precise nature of
such evidence – whether mail, bills, checks, invoices, other
documents, or keys.”145 The court further stated that it would be
“patently unreasonable” for the officers to be expected to know the
exact locations of such evidence.146
3.

Payton’s “Circumstances Indicating a Likelihood” Standard Is
Impractical and Creates a Loophole That Undermines Privacy

In Payton, the court held the search of the computer and its
subsequent seizure was unreasonable because there was no
evidence to implicate the computer, even though the computer
would be a logical place to find spreadsheets and other
documents enumerated in the warrant.147 The trouble with this
holding is that it requires officers to have advance knowledge of
the form and location in which evidence may be found (e.g., that
the evidence will be electronic in nature and will be found in a
computer). However, the Fourth Amendment does not require a
list of the items to be searched (e.g., a safe, file cabinet,
computer). Since an officer does not need to make such a
showing on the original warrant, it makes little sense to create a
stricter standard once a previously unknown computer is
discovered.
As noted above, courts in other jurisdictions have found this
requirement to be unreasonable.148 The likely result of such a
condition is that computers will be listed on a warrant if it is likely
that the items sought could be found on a computer, regardless of
142

People v. Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
144
Id. at 216.
145
Id. at 217 (quoting People v. Rogers, 232 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)).
146
Balint, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 208 (quoting People v. Rogers, 232 Cal. Rptr. 294,
298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
147
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009).
148
See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); People v. Gall,
30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 864 N.E. 471, 484 (Mass.
2007); Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218.
143
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any advance knowledge as to their presence in order for officers
to preserve the option of a computer search should a computer be
found. This in turn incentivizes an end run around the Ninth
Circuit’s rule that, absent listing the computer in the warrant,
evidence must be found implicating a particular computer in order
to render the seizure and search reasonable.149
C.

COMPUTERS ARE NOT TRADITIONAL CONTAINERS ANDSHOULD
REQUIRE DIFFERENT SEARCH PROTOCOLS
AND A
WARRANT

Due to the vast amount of information a computer can hold, a
search for a few documents can easily turn into a general search
in the absence of judicial supervision.150 The Ninth Circuit
expressed such a concern if it was to uphold the search of
Payton’s computer under a traditional container theory, because
“[s]uch a ruling would eliminate any incentive for officers to seek
explicit judicial authorization for searches of computers.”151
Since a search of a computer is fundamentally different from
a search of any other type of container,152 the better approach is
to have a search protocol specific to computers. This section
outlines the differences between a computer and a traditional
container, such as the vastly superior amount of information a
computer can hold, the mechanism by which a computer holds
information, and the physical limitations of a computer. Next, this
section discusses briefly how courts dealt with new technologies
before the advent of computers. Finally, the section concludes by
discussing the concerns outlined in Payton.
1.

Differences Between a Computer and a Traditional Container

The impulse to analogize a computer to a traditional container
is natural. A computer is an object that contains things, just as
any traditional container does. However, this is where the
similarity between a computer and a traditional container ends.
While the contents of an open container are visible to the naked
eye, a computer contains much more. In fact, it is the inherent
opaqueness of a computer’s digital contents, and the privacy that

149

Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64.
Id. at 864.
151
Id.
152
Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64.
150
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it allows the user, that is both its damning quality (for those
conducting searches) and its allure (for just about everyone else).
The first distinction between a container and a computer is
that a computer does not “hold” data in the traditional sense.
Rather, it is composed of data.153 The structure of a file cabinet is
a shell with drawers, and it can contain file folders. But the
essence of a computer is its files – a great many files.154 One
gigabyte155 of storage can hold 100,000 pages of single-spaced
text.156 A new computer in early 2010 has the capacity to store
upwards of eight terabytes – the equivalent of roughly 800 million
pages of single-spaced text.157 Simply put, there is no traditional
“container” that can match a computer in terms of the sheer
volume of information it can hold.
Another obvious difference is in how the dimensions of a
traditional container inherently limit a search. An officer may look
for items enumerated in the warrant only in places where they
might be found and cannot look in a place smaller than the item to
be seized.158 However, the natural limitation a container imposes
upon a search does not apply to a computer. The computer
provides no clue as to what the bytes of information stored inside
it comprise. Even if it is known that a piece of evidence can be
found within the computer, an officer conducting a search of that
computer is provided relatively little in the way of signposts to
indicate which bytes of data to examine. For example, a folder
labeled “music” may not necessarily contain music files. The
search can quickly become the equivalent of looking for a needle
in a digital haystack.159

153

Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity
Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2007).
154
Id.
155
Gigabytes and terabytes are units of measurement for data storage capacity or
computer memory. The smallest measurable unit is a bit. There are 8 bits in a byte. A
gigabyte is the approximate equivalent of one million bytes. A terabyte is the approximate
equivalent of one trillion bytes.
See Byte Converter, What’s A Byte?,
http://www.whatsabyte.com/P1/byteconverter.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
156
Jason McKay, Why Should I Use Electronic Signatures?, Articles 3000,
http://www.articles3000.com/Gadgets-and-Gizmos/13901/Why-Should-I-Use-ElectronicSignatures.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
157
Id.;
Apple
Store,
Mac
Pro
Technical
Specifications,
http://www.apple.com/macpro/specs.html (last visited April 11, 2010).
158
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
159
Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 279, 301 (2005).
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Other Atypical Containers

Before computers, courts had to apply search and seizure
requirements to other atypical containers.160 Items such as
audiotapes and pagers have been construed as types of
containers that can hold potential evidence.161
As with a
computer, one cannot tell just by looking at a videotape what is
stored on the videotape.162 The only way to find out what it
contains is to play it back.163 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit has
upheld a search (i.e., a “viewing”) of a cassette tape,164 and an
Illinois appellate court allowed the seizure and subsequent search
of an eight-millimeter tape.165
Despite the similarities, there are differences between a tape
and a computer. At a minimum, these types of items dictate the
form of the contents. An audiocassette tape will contain an audio
record. With a videotape, one is assured of finding visual images.
Both of these media have inherent limitations that help narrow a
search. One would not play back an audiotape to search for a
video recording. A computer, however, has no such limitations. If
the item can be reduced to a digital form, the computer may
contain it.166
3.

Different Search Protocols for Computers

Despite the impulse to compare a computer to a container,
the Ninth Circuit has shifted away from applying traditional
container search protocols to computers, due to the difficulties
noted above. As previously stated, while a specific search
warrant is not necessary to search a traditional container, Payton
appears to hold that a search warrant is necessary to search a
computer.167
The Payton court noted the differences between the search of
a computer and a search of a container. “[S]earches of computers
160

United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. (microcassette audio tape); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.
1990) (pager).
162
People v. Donath, 827 N.E.2d 1001, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
163
Id.
164
Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d at 654-55.
165
Donath, 827 N.E.2d at 1013.
166
Currently, most things can be reduced to a digital form; examples include music,
videos, and photographs, as well as every type of document, including books, newspapers,
and bills.
167
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2009).
161
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. . . involve a degree of intrusiveness much greater in quantity, if
not different in kind, from searches of other containers. Such
considerations commonly support the need specifically to
authorize the search of computers in a search warrant.”168 The
court further noted that “affidavits seeking warrants for the search
of computers often include a limiting search protocol, and judges
issuing warrants may place conditions on the manner and extent
of such searches, to protect privacy and other important
constitutional interests.”169 In contrast, no search warrant is
required to look inside a “traditional” container if it could harbor the
evidence sought.170 Thus, a computer might best be described as
a “place” to be searched, rather than a type of container, making a
computer more analogous to a house.
Despite acknowledging these differences, the court
recognized that computers must still be susceptible to searches. It
stated in Giberson:
While it is true that computers can store a large amount of
material, there is no reason why officers should be permitted to
search a room full of filing cabinets or even a person’s library for
documents listed in a warrant but should not be able to search a
computer.171

This statement, however, was made with one caveat: in order to
search a computer, a warrant must be sought.172
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S IMPLIED BRIGHT-LINE RULE
In Payton, the court analyzed the question of whether a
search warrant that authorized (1) a search of Payton’s premises
and (2) seizure of records such as “[s]ales ledgers showing
narcotics transactions such as pay/owe sheets,” authorized the
officers to look for such records in Payton’s computer.173 The
Payton court applied its “recent and controlling precedent” of
Giberson and answered the question in the negative. Under the
facts present in Payton, the warrant did not authorize a search of

168

Id. at 862.
Id. at 864.
170
United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984).
171
United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008).
172
Id. at 890-91.
173
Payton, 573 F.3d at 862.
169
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Payton’s computer.174 Whether or not it intended to do so, the
Payton court – with its imprecise discussion of Giberson –
appears to have created a bright-line rule: to search a computer,
even for items listed on a warrant that could be contained in the
computer, the officers must have a warrant authorizing the
computer’s search.175
In Giberson, the court indicated that it was not endorsing the
proposition that a “computer is an exception to the general
principle that a warrant authorizing the seizure of particular
documents also authorizes the search of a container likely to
contain those documents.”176 The defendant in Giberson had
urged the court to hold that, if a computer was not listed on the
warrant, it could not be seized or searched.177 But the Giberson
court instead held that, because there had been ample evidence
near the computer to indicate that “seizable items” were stored on
the computer, it was reasonable for the officers “to secure the
computer and obtain a specific warrant and search it.”178
The Payton court summarized Giberson as having examined
the question of whether “computers [are] exception[s] to the
general principle that a warrant authorizing the seizure of
particular documents also authorizes the search of a container
likely to contain those documents.”179 The Payton court quoted
Giberson’s holding: “We hold that, in this case, where there was
ample evidence that the documents in the warrant could be found
on Giberson’s computer, the officers did not exceed the scope of
the warrant when they seized the computer.”180 The Payton court
then interpreted the passage as holding that, under certain
circumstances, computers are not an exception to the rule
permitting searches of containers and, by “negative inference,”
where such “certain circumstances” are absent, “a search of a
computer not expressly authorized by a warrant is not a
reasonable search.”181 Thus, the Payton court suggested that it
was merely applying a rule already established in Giberson:
officers can conduct a search of a computer for seizable items that
could be stored in the computer only if they possess a warrant
174

Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 863-64.
176
Giberson, 572 F.3d at 887-88.
177
Id. at 886.
178
Id. at 889.
179
Payton, 573 F.3d at 862-63.
180
Id. at 863 (quoting Giberson, 572 F.3d at 887) (emphasis in original).
181
Id.
175
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authorizing a search of the computer, except in circumstances
where – as in Giberson – there is evidence indicating that the
seizable items are in the computer.182
The Payton court’s application of Giberson was flawed in two
critical respects. First, the court blurs the distinction between
seizing a computer and searching it. Second, in its analysis, the
court glosses over the critical fact that the officers in Giberson
obtained a subsequent warrant before conducting their search of
the computer. The Giberson court had approved the officers’ twostep process of “securing” the computer and then obtaining a
subsequent warrant that specifically authorized its search.183 The
holding of Payton, and a proper reading of the Giberson case,
leads to one conclusion: In order to search a computer for
seizable items that may be found on the computer, a warrant,
either the initial one or a subsequent one, is required.184
This conclusion is further supported by the court’s repeated
expression of concerns about computer searches conducted
without a warrant and the need for judicial oversight.185 The court
noted that
the nature of computers makes such searches so intrusive that
affidavits seeking warrants for the search of computers often
include a limiting search protocol, and judges issuing warrants
may place conditions on the manner and extent of such
searches, to protect privacy and other important constitutional
interests.186

The court further stated that it was “important to preserve the
option of imposing such conditions when they are deemed
warranted by judicial officers authorizing the search of
computers.”187 Finally, the court pointed to the officers’ actions in
Giberson and noted that the “searching officers . . . stop[ped] and
[sought] an explicit warrant when they encounter[ed] a computer
that they [had] reason to believe should be searched.”188
While the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant Giberson’s brightline proposition that a computer can never be searched if it is not
182

Id.
Id.
184
Giberson, 572 F.3d at 889; Payton, 573 F.3d at 863.
185
Payton, 573 F.3d at 864.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
183
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listed on the original warrant,189 in Payton, it suggested that a
computer cannot be searched without a warrant.190 So, while
other containers found during a warrant-based search may be
searched under authority of the warrant, the same does not hold
true for a computer. Thus in Payton, the Ninth Circuit appeared to
do precisely what it said it would not do in Giberson: create a
bright-line rule that a warrant is necessary for a search of a
computer.
IV. TOWARD A PRACTICAL STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS IN
COMPUTER SEARCHES
In practice, the apparent bright-line rule in Payton will likely
not serve its purpose of protecting searches of computers.
Officers will include computers on all future search warrants if any
of the items they seek could reasonably be found on a computer.
By doing so, they will preserve the option of a search without the
need to present ample evidence in support of such a search but in
the process will obliterate any pretense of computer privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.
A more practical standard of
reasonableness in computer searches and warrants is needed.
This Part analyzes why a seizure is often necessary before a
search and concludes with a proposed guideline for future
computer searches.
A.

WHY A SEIZURE IS ADVISABLE BEFORE A SEARCH

The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between the officer’s
actions in Payton and the officer’s actions in Giberson.191 In
Payton, the officer searched first and seized second; whereas in
Giberson, the officer seized first, then sought a warrant and
searched second.192 The Supreme Court has recognized the lessintrusive nature of a seizure of property, noting that, while “[a]
seizure affects a person’s possessory interest; a search affects a
person’s privacy interest.”193 The Ninth Circuit echoed this
observation and acknowledged that, while “[a] seizure of a
computer to await a second warrant is nevertheless a Fourth
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Amendment seizure, . . . it is far less intrusive than a search.”194
This distinction recognizes the vast amount of information a
computer can hold and the possible constitutional rights that may
be trampled if the search is conducted without judicial
supervision.195 The Supreme Court has noted that, while property
may be temporarily seized without a warrant, no further action will
be allowed without a warrant.196 A neutral, detached magistrate
will first have to determine if there is sufficient probable cause to
carry out the search of the seized property.197
Of course, the mandate to seize first and search second is
contrary to the usual protocol of a search and seizure. Officers
are allowed to seize only those items specifically authorized by the
warrant.198 The warrant must name both the specific place to be
searched and the particular items to be seized.199 Computers,
however, pose a significant problem in this area because the
documents to be seized, which may be in the form of electronic
files, are often intermingled with scores of other files.200 Without a
search-limiting protocol in place, a search of a computer’s files
can quickly devolve into an impermissible and unconstitutional
general search.201
Arguably, the absence of a search-limiting protocol is what
the court was most concerned with in Payton.202 The officer found
the computer in Payton’s bedroom, moved the mouse, deactivated
the screen saver, and then clicked on the first file he saw.203
While it is true that some of the items in the warrant could be
found in the computer, there were no set limitations guiding his
search. Searching a computer without established parameters is
tantamount to going into a house and opening drawers
indiscriminately. The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent
precisely that kind of arbitrary government search.
A computer search can require a level of technical expertise
beyond that of the executing officers and can take hours to
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complete.204 This is due to the possibility that the data sought
“may be mislabeled, encrypted, stored in hidden directories, or
embedded in ‘slack space’ that a simple file listing will ignore.”205
As a result, requiring officers to search through computer files on
the premises in order to seize only those files listed on the warrant
has been recognized as unreasonable.206 A lengthy on-site
computer search can also be overly intrusive to the premises
occupants.207
These considerations in turn have made it
necessary for officers to make a wholesale seizure of the
computer in order to search it at a different time and location and
under the guidance of a new warrant.208 This exemplifies how the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement has demanded
flexibility to adapt to the challenges of new technologies. Many
courts have responded by adopting a new Fourth Amendment
rule: “A valid warrant entitles investigators to seize computers and
search them off-site at a later date.”209
B.

A PROPOSED GUIDELINE FOR SEIZING AND SECURING A
COMPUTER

The main concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Payton is
the need to protect privacy interests that are easily violated in
computer searches not subject to judicial supervision.210 If a
computer is discovered in the course of a search, and it is
reasonable to believe that the evidence sought could be found on
the computer, the computer should be seized, and a second
warrant to govern the search of the computer should be
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obtained.211
There are practical considerations in implementing such a
procedure. As was the case in Payton, computers are frequently
left “on” and in screen-saver mode or in standby or sleep mode.212
In order to seize a computer and protect the computer’s data (and
physical components in the computer itself), the computer must be
properly powered down. Failing to do so could jeopardize
unsaved work in open applications and possibly the entire hard
drive.213 In order to preserve the integrity of the computer, Fourth
Amendment protections, and the administration of justice, officers
should follow this proposed set of guidelines in order to establish a
clear and consistent protocol for computer seizures:
Proposed Computer Seizure Protocol
1. Note the circumstances that lead the officer to believe the
computer may contain the evidence sought on the warrant.
Examples of such circumstances include whether the evidence
sought is easily reduced to digital form214 and whether there is
anything prohibiting the computer from working in its normal
capacity.215
2. Note whether the computer is powered off, in screen-saver
mode, or in standby or sleep mode. By recording the status of
the computer, the officer can justify moving the mouse as would
be necessary to properly power down the computer.216

211

Recommended computer search protocols and guidelines are beyond the scope
of this Note.
212
When a computer is in standby or sleep mode, it is still “on,” but the screen
appears dark because the computer is using less electricity. A screen saver is activated on
most computers when a computer is not in use after a specified period of time (as set by
the user). The purpose of a screen saver is to prevent phosphor burn-in on the computer
screen – something that was of concern with older cathode-ray-tube screens but less so
now with LCD screens.
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your battery runs out of charge while you are working, you will lose all work since you last
saved.”
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a. If the computer is in standby or sleep mode, move the
mouse or press the return key to reactivate the screen.
Record what is on the screen. This would ensure a
complete and accurate record of what was done and what
was seen in the course of seizing the computer.
b. If the computer is in screen-saver mode, note what is on
the screen saver. Move the mouse and de-activate the
screen saver. Note again what is on the screen.
3. Save any open documents. This needs to be done to protect
against the possible loss of any data.
4. Close all open applications. This will ensure against possible
corruption to the computer hard drive and its applications.
5. Power down the computer properly.

By recording the steps taken in seizing the computer and
making a note of all that was done and seen, a complete record of
what happened to the computer will be available for both the
police and the magistrate.217 The officer should then prepare a
new affidavit seeking a search warrant from the magistrate. The
affidavit should state the reasons why a search of the computer is
necessary, outline the steps that were taken to preserve the
computer and its contents during the seizure, and describe the
search protocol that will be used to protect privacy interests. This
equivalent of chain-of-custody documentation would serve the
government’s interest in preserving evidence while protecting the
individual’s right of privacy in his or her computer.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Payton, the Ninth Circuit properly reversed the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by
way of a computer search not listed in a warrant. However, the
court based its reasoning on an impractical standard of
reasonableness that it first enunciated in Giberson. In order to
search a computer not listed on a warrant, the court stated there
must be circumstances indicating a likelihood that the items to be
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seized are contained in the computer.218 This standard means
that it is not enough that the items sought could reasonably be
found on the computer. This creates a significantly stricter
standard than that employed for traditional containers.
In Payton and Giberson, the Ninth Circuit appears to have
done precisely what it said it would not do: create a bright-line
rule for computers. The court distinguished computers from
traditional containers and applied to computers a heightened
standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.219 The court
further implied that, in order to search a computer, it is necessary
to procure a search warrant.220 By obtaining a warrant, the court
reasoned that constitutional privacy interests could be
protected.221 Since the circumstances in Payton failed to meet the
heightened reasonableness standard and the officer did not obtain
a search warrant before searching the computer, the court arrived
at the correct result: suppression of the evidence. But the court’s
new standard has the unfortunate effect of creating hurdles for
police officers seeking to conduct a computer search. To get
around the heightened reasonableness standard that requires
demonstrating circumstances that show evidence would be found
on a particular computer, officers will request authorization to
search a computer in every case where evidence could be
reduced to a digital form. This will undermine the very privacy
interests that the Payton court sought to protect.
In computer search cases, when officers need to seize a
computer for a subsequent search, they should follow the
Proposed Computer Seizure Protocol in order to ensure that
privacy interests are protected and that the integrity of the
computer remains intact. This will have the benefit of enhancing
the government’s ability to properly prosecute crimes while at the
same time preserving citizens’ privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. That is a result that surely would satisfy the Payton
court.
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